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The current development of communication systems in
advanced countries has led, as a first effect, to a spec-
tacular increase in information supply. Citizens, con-
tinually invaded by an avalanche of information which
overwhelms their receptive and interpretative possibil-
ities, are forced to make tools to help them find their
bearings in this muddle of stimuli and, at the same
time, transform their environment into a coherent and
useful structure insofar as it contains the essential con-
ditions for its social fulfillment. Thus, individuals cre-
ating their own cultural dimension create themselves
in a continuous process of reciprocal configuration be-
tween themselves and their environment.
This effort to give structure to their own cultural
spaces is not carried out by individuals haphazardly
associating stimuli and enunciates. To carry out this
task, they apply selection and organisation criteria
which basically respond to their interests and the
search for immediate satisfaction. But what criteria al-
low structuring a specific useful world of their own?
How do they go from one world to another? How do
they arrive there? How and in what order do they live
the diverse options?
Generally, we can say that people are always dis-
posed to find what they seek or what is indiscretely
opposed to their expectations. Because of this, the re-
ceptive possibilities of individuals diminish to the
point of blindness when faced with what neither helps
nor hinders the follow-up of their expectations.
Double reading
From this point of view, the world constructed by indi-
viduals functions as a real pragmatic tool, as it con-
tributes the first hypotheses on the pertinent elements
offered, while making possible the construction of a
semantic universe adequate to their interests.
To achieve this aim, individuals proceed to inter-
pret the stimuli offered. This basically consists of two
phases: the first is to carry out an effective reading
process which will allow, in a second phase, establish-
ing previous hypotheses and advancing in the field of
supposable interpretations, to the construction of a co-
herent whole.
The first phase implies taking in all the information
and dividing it into parts which inspire interest, wheth-
er it is in answer to past experience or because of inter-
esting expectations. To advance in building up a co-
herent whole, individuals submit the material of per-
ception to analysis, comparison, and selection of the
parts, while establishing new relationships which sat-
isfy the same predominating condition. This condition
acts as a pre-definition which, while giving cover to
facts and objects, identifies them as probable or capa-
ble of forming part of the same structure. Thus, the
uniformity or regularity of the elements only makes
sense insofar as they are part of the world we ourselves
are building.
The basic characteristic of this first phase is that the
whole process of forming the macrostructure of defini-
tion belongs exclusively to the contents of the text of-
fered. This is not the same in the second phase, where,
in retrospect, we build a personal world which gives
coherence to the supply of information.
Readers/interpreters are led to collaborate, making
forecasts and establishing suppositions on the possible
development of the text until they make up a hypothe-
sis on possible worlds. Starting up these hypotheses,
motivated by the complex webs of relationships inter-
preters establish among the relevant elements of the
text's discourse which they extract from their own life-
experiences, allows them to go from the structures of
discourse offered by text to the pragmatic structures of
the possible world. Quite the contrary of the first
phase, here the readers/interpreters use meta-text tools
to elaborate a plan from inference in which hypothe-
ses, duly evaluated and put in order, contrast, confirm
or inform till they build up an over-all possible world
which gives coherence to the whole.
From this pragmatic dimension, we could say that
all information goes in search of an addressee, and that
this search is a necessary condition, not only for its
communication situation, but also for its potential sig-
nificance. The model reader, as Eco says, is a set of
conditions for success established by the text which
must be satisfied for a text to be fully realised in its
potential contents.
This pragmatic perspective allows us not to limit
the potential contents of a text to that directly derived
from foreseeable and regulated text strategies based on
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the addressee's interpretative function, but rather on
its enlargement by contents coming from pragmatic
work generated by the text itself. Thus, this second
phase must be understood as a constituent part of the
text itself to the extent that it contains a structure and
a system of potentially dynamic mechanisms which
generate inferential processes in the receiver to com-
plete the text and «make it belong».
The addressee, while identifying with the model
reader presupposed by the text, cannot detach from
the real reader who is a person. However much the
success of the text's meaning always requires satisfying
the set of conditions which are the model reader, this
must necessarily be completed by the pragmatic activi-
ty of reading, that is, by effectivc-iy bringing up to date
the encyclopaedic potential and the inevitable compe-
tence of the situation, which has not necessarily been
foreseen by the author and which goes beyond simple
identification and localisation of the referents.
Distancing the model reader from the process of
interpretation of the empiric reader for fear of becom-
ing totally subjective leads to simplifying and an equiv-
ocal partiality of the process of interpretation. The
reader cannot be reduced to a simple innocent execu-
tor or victim of the trap laid by the text. If such a thing
could exist, this ideal reader would be totally ingenu-
ous, lacking in critical spirit and incapable of question-
ing proposals given in the text. I insist, we cannot di-
vide bringing the text up to date from reflection and
critique imposed by the text itself.
From the point of view of the pragmatic produc-
tion of significance, the interpretation required by the
logical reconstruction of meanings foreseen by the au-
thor is no more than a pre-condition for its full inter-
pretation. The process of interpretation goes beyond
the simple following-up of the strategies inscribed in
the reading process. The addressees, by their interpre-
tation, modify and correct hypotheses which, during
every moment of the reading process, they consider
valid.
Inevitable possible worlds
The theory of the meaning of phrases begun by logician
Richard Montague at the end of the 70's, gives us a
quite useful focus for the process of interpretation. As
it validates meaning based on premises of a previously
established «model» or Possible World (henceforth PW),
it allows us to reason and treat assertions on worlds
which, although we know they will never be true (the
worlds of fiction, of our dreams and hopes, our fears
and farces, etc.), are lived and validated as realities.
Normally, the concept of PW has been applied to
the study of narrative fiction, which is distinguished by
closed structured constructions based on a restricted
description of reality and a limited number of individ-
uals, characteristics, and possibilities which are also
limited. But insofar as we consider the construction of
a PW as the result of a cooperative interaction between
the enunciate describing it and the addressee interpret-
ing it, the enunciate takes on a new dimension in the
sense that it becomes a narrative structure destined to
raise hypotheses about what is possible. The interpre-
tation of an enunciate thus extends to a theoretical
construction which goes beyond reading and under-
standing of the different levels of codes, selection of
isotopes or macrostructures of the fable... to place us
on a second plane of interpretation represented by the
metatextual and over-all strategy of critique. If we also
extend the concept of enunciate to the whole supply of
stimuli which any social individual receives and is
forced to interpret based on hopes or the foreseeable,
the PW aquires an original dimension which defines
successive realities and lived experiences and, conse-
quently, behaviour taken up in successive PW's.
In the PW of fiction, the basic rule for entry is that
the enunciator and the enunciatee tacitly subscribe to
a «fiction pact» by which the enunciatee suspends dis-
belief and accepts the imaginary world presented. That
is to say, the addressee, even knowing that what is
shown or insinuated is an imaginary story, does not
because of this think that it is a lie. In the case of PW's
structured from the offer and presence of all stimuli
offered by the everiday environment, the pact is less
precise (it does not pass through the cash-register or
the purchase of a book, as in narrative fiction), as less
precise as are the rules, when deciding which elements
are offered and how, are basically conditioned by the
degree of relevance they express based on what we
want to know or believe we must know and, conse-
quently, the inferences they activate.
In any case, whether it be in the restricted sense of
production and interpretation of intentional enunci-
ates, or in its widest sense, that is, successive PW's gen-
erated by the perception and interpretation of our sur-
roundings, the concept of the PW is similar, and appli-
cable in both cases.
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A PW is a real world
A PW is «real» insofar as it refers to a narrative world
in a cultural structure which, although it is not effec-
tive, is «true» to the extent that it is made up of a
group of individuals endowed with qualities and
events which we can judge to be possible and coherent.
In a scientific treatise, the concept of truth is essen-
tial and is, thus, incompatible with that of falsehood.
On the other hand, a PW, although the enunciate may
be called literally false, can be accepted as a metaphor-
ical truth. The acceptance of this truth, basic and es-
sential for the acceptance of the PW, is not incompati-
ble with its being «literally false». For example, al-
though it is false that rabbits speak, grumble, and run
around to the rhythm of the tick-tack of their watches,
insofar as we participate in the PW proposed by Lewis
Carroll, these facts do not surprise us. In fact, we actu-
ally accept them as metaphorical truths. The willing
suspension of disbelief, even though it implies being
conscious of the fact that Wonderland does not exist,
«is not true», does not therefore make us believe that
it is a lie.
On the other hand, if the real everyday world is
ruled by the concept of evident truth, the PW is ruled
by the concept of circumstantial truth. The truth of a
PW is accepted if, and only if, the individuals who in-
habit it, their qualities and behaviour (be they implicit
or explicit) have an unquestionably real circumstantial
existence, analogous to what is current in the real
world of experience and can thus be judged as reason-
able and evaluated as possible. From this point of view,
the concept of truth is not a rigid, unmovable concept,
but rather, as Goodman says, «it is a condition docile
and obedient» to the circumstances which affirm it.
In the specific case of an audio-visual enunciate,
credibility is reinforced if the presentation is judged as
realistic because of its analogy to what it refers to. Ob-
viously, the degree of realism attributed to the audio-
visual enunciate is intimately linked to the usual sys-
tem of presentation that rules the context in which the
PW is placed. For example, it should not surprise us
that the degree of realism given by 12th century chris-
tians to characters and religious scenes presented in
mural paintings on church walls is significantly differ-
ent from what post-industrial society today gives these
same works when admiring them on museum walls.
In a PW, the concept of truth, like that of false-
hood, must be understood as separated from univer-
salism. Truth, even though it be presented to us as un-
questionable and beyond opinion and interest, is al-
ways a conventional and temporal construction in a
PW, and is only valid in these circumstances. Outside
its PW, a true fact or value does not necessarily remain
true. Whence the fact that truth can only admit trans-
ference to another PW with great difficulty.
Therefore, what we propose is only true or false
whitin the general framework or topic which defines
the PW, and only if this truth is adequate to the way
the addressee has constructed it, implying this and
none other. If these requisites are fulfilled, the truths in
a PW are solid and unquestionable ones.
However, the truths of the real world can always
be questioned. Everything we believe historically or
scientifically true is subject to the appearance (by
chance or research) of a new truth which invalidates
the former as such. Thus, it could possibly be the case
that one day we discover, for example, that Che Gue-
vara was not captured or executed by the Bolivian
Army special forces and that the corpse exhibited at
the Villa Grande hospital mortuari in Nauta in 1967
was that of an impostor. On the contrary, in the do-
maine of the PW this possibility does not exist; truth is
not allowed to be questioned. In spite of the fact that
Snow-White, the Stepmother, and the Prince have nev-
er really existed in the real, experienced world, this
does not invalidate their being «real and true» in the
PW presented in the tale from the brothers Grimm,
and it would be false to say that Snow-White died by
being poisoned by the Prince, or that the Stepmother
married the Prince. It cannot be any other way. Snow-
White marries the Prince and the evil Stepmother is
punished. These truths cannot be invalidated, unless
we propose another fictional PW or one in which that
does not happen. But this latter PW will never invali-
date or transform the truth of the first into a lie. It
would simply be a different PW. As Eco says, « narra -
tivity gives us anchored worlds which float less than
the real universe, although we usually believe the op-
posite».
Even so, it is not the equivalent of a closed model
from which we can judge and evaluate proposals, but
rather to be understood as the simple schematisation
of a situation, oriented so that the addressee can ac-
cept it as possible and, joining in it, complete it. The
proposal of a PW is similar to the «mise en scene» of a
limited number of individuals and qualities, recognisa-
ble insofar as they belong to the experienced world and
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deemed pertinent for the representation of the whole
PW we wish to present. The proposal of a PW cannot
be reduced to a mere exposition and understanding of
passive elements, but must be understood as the synec-
dochal plan of an active structure widened by the offer
of spaces which the addressee has to complete by infer-
ence.
Insofar as it is the synecdochal plan of a situation,
the proposal of a PW must give the necessary «clues»
so as to be able to identify pertinent identities which
allow placing and accepting the real world which is the
reference. From these identities, we must predict qual-
ities and behaviours which the interpreter must com-
plete, depending on the proposal. A PW is not a totally
autonomous structure in comparison to the real world.
Some of these identities and their behaviour must be-
long to the real world of our experience. In the same
way that it is not possible to characterise all the indi-
viduals and qualities which people a PW, it is also not
possible to describe all their «real» world. As they are
governed by rules, some of these qualities are taken
from the real world and adjust to the the same rules of
our experienced world and, thus, if there is no indica-
tion to the contrary, are left to the addressee's capacity
for semantic explanation.
For a PW's proposal, we only have the description
of pertinent elements that can make up a narrative
whole which allows us to infer the whole of the specif-
ic PW. For each of these qualities we must specify its
essentials. Although all qualities are necessary for the
recognition of the specific PW, we must establish hier-
archies among them so that some of them become de-
terminant and, consequently, prevail over others which
are considered an accident or less obligatory when jus-
tifying individual behaviour.
This hierarchy is decisive when completing a PW,
as defining specific qualities is equal to recognising the
structure of the PW on the basis of valid possible inter-
nal relationships. On the contrary, accidental qualities,
although they are not denied and are present and avail-
able, are not taken into account when relating to the
structure of the PW.
The different interpretations of a PW require it to
be constructed in such a way that the objects appear-
ing there go in the direction of the projected discourse.
That is to say, we must subordinate possible inferential
processes to the audience's capacity for semantic ex-
planation, defined by «that which everyone knows
that others know, and that these know everyone
knows». Thus, the enunciator, and the enunciatee as
well, must foresee the inhibition of implication and
non-pertinent inferential processes so as to lead the
process towards established aims. In this sense, all pos-
sible cultural reconstructions which will act in the
process of inference must be filtered, and all elements
susceptible of generating non-pertinent or detracting
interferences must be eliminated or neutralised. Ele-
ments which are pertinent can cause «omission values»
unforeseen by the enunciator and thus distort, and
must also be elided.
Thus, when qualifying the description of synecdo-
che, we could say, like Nelson Goodman and Elgin,
that «the PW does not exist in the text, but rather out-
side it». Constructing a PW is essentially equivalent to
attributing certain qualities to certain individuals so
that they «embody» physical and psychical qualities
which are exactly what we want to explain about
them.
Transiting through PW's
As I have said, the overload of stimuli offered by our
environment forces us to select a part of it and restruc-
ture it in a coherent PW which can respond to our in-
terests and expectations. From this perspective, there
are two basic ways of living these worlds:
a) transiting through them by acceeding to them
one after the other or, on the contrary
b) living them simultaneously.
In the first case, worlds become successive realities
which we could define as the «Little Prince» transit
because of the similarities with Antoine de Saint-Ex-
upéry's story. As the reader will remember, the Little
Prince goes through different planets, one after the
other, which are inhabited by a king, a vain man, a
drunkard, a businessman, a light-man, and a geogra-
pher, and in each of them the Little Prince makes an
effort to understand and adapt to the logic which rules
there.
In the second case, which we will call Alice, the
structure is similar to that of Lewis Carroll's story of
Alice in Wonderland, where she lives different and
even opposite worlds simultaneously; the world of the
Queen of Hearts with her always arbitrary rules, the
world of the hurried Hare with pink eyes who is al-
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ways a victim of the dictatorship of time, the Mad
Hatter who inhabits a world where madness and
laughter are a priority... All of them coexist and inter-
act before a disconcerted Alice.
It is obvious that in the world of everyday reality
these two ways of living PWs can never occur in an
isolated way, but rather that the concommitance and
intersection between them is inevitable. At any rate,
and for methodological reasons, we will proceed to a
separate analysis of these two options.
Lineal transit of the Little Prince
Within the everyday world, the transit through PWs
rather answers to what the Little Prince sets out. As we
are always immersed in a specific PW, we consider be-
haviour coherent if it responds to the rules that prevail
there.
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We always live in a PW and we go lineally from one
to another. Each of them is presented as a possible
«welcome place we could inhabit». Welcome places
where we could find other beings and other lives we
live with and, generally, promise interesting futures.
As many of the situations presented by a PW are
dynamic and individual's qualities continually appear
and disappear, the world as such is never the same, it is
always subject to transformation and change during its
development, and, in this sense, a PW is an orderly suc-
cession of events which we live as a reality in present
time and space.
Only breaking this orderly succession can lead us
to another PW. To get there, we must previously aban-
don the current PW and adopt the next PW as present.
It is thus that we formalise and accede to successive
states of the world, reliable and believable inasmuch
as PW's which are present and real, only limited by the
preceding worlds which have already been lived and
the following, supposed, desired or feared, but always
possible to live. Only the present PW presents itself as
real: it is useless for Alice, during the parade of crayfish
and sea-urchins, to try to prove to the vain Dodo and
the smoking caterpillar that her world is the true, real
one, and not the one they are living at that moment.
Thus, linking one PW after another, we experiment
different realities where the elements and behaviour al-
lowable in one are often contradicted by those possi-
ble in another. This is the Little Prince's feeling when
he visits the characters of another PW and does not un-
derstand how its inhabitants can think that things
which have no value for him are important: numbers,
hurry, discipline... It is a matter of a new PW, with to-
tally inverse values where men think that what is banal
and without substance in the Little Prince's world is
something serious. On the contrary, what is considered
unimportant in the world of men is precisely the Little
Prince's reason for living.
Access and acceptance of a new PW always re-
quires an effort of understanding, adapting, and as-
suming the individuals and their logic ruling there.
This effort gives fruit if the essential structures of this
world are understandable, that is, if during its devel-
opment, the relationship of individuals to qualities
generates structures similar to those of the world it
proceeds from. If this is so, the transit through PW's is
not conflictive, as these worlds, although they respond
to their own logic, keep similarities which make them
comparable. Each of the planets visited by the Little
Prince have internal coherence, but do not interfere
with each other. One after another, the worlds become
real, while the other planets go into the memory of the
past or remain among the expectations for the future.
It is quite probable that, from a more distant perspec-
tive, the lineality of the transit through the PW's tends
towards a repetitious circularity where future PW's are
no more than repetitions or renewed versions of past
PW's, although they are relatively different because of
an accumulation of life experiences.
We go from one world to another. We transit
through them, and in each of them we appreciate the
differences, although in fact these differences come
more from an excluding hierarchy we make of specific
individuals than from the composition proper to these
worlds. The degree of stress we place on specific indi-
viduals and facts gives them a relative predominance
which makes us construct different plans of categories
from one and the same context and, thus, different
PW's are generated. There is very little resemblance to
the sleepy dreams of travellers during a long early
morning Underground trip to work.
At any rate, the possible and varied interpretations
to which we submit received information does not
mean that the number of PW's is infinite. Their number
172
Jordi Pericot
is always limited by the PWs own definition which
makes some elements and not others pertinent, and
also by the addressee's level of communication and in-
terpretation competence. Thus, although limited, the
PWs vary according to the individual.
Alice and the cohabitation of PWs
The second way of living PWs is living them simulta-
neously, as is Alice's case when she finds herself im-
mersed in a chaotic mixture of different worlds. Alice
finds one surprise after another: as soon as she recog-
nises a PW and lives it as real, other PWs are inter-
posed which become contradictory from Alice's point
of view as she has not had time to assimilate its rules.
Quite on the contrary to the lineal route of the Lit-
tle Prince, in Alice's world a present PW comes into
contact with other PWs, making up a mosaic struc-
ture. The interaction of some of its common traits al-
lows her to live all of them, although always under the
dominance of the logic prevailing in one of them when
interpreting individuals and behaviour which furnish
the PWs.
Thus, within the logic of PW1 (fig. 1), and thanks
to the intersections operating with worlds 2 and 3, it is
possible to co-inhabit all three worlds, in spite of their
differences. This is the mosaic structure presented to
Alice. The PWs, all of them present, cohabit even
though the more of less rigid logic of the predominant
world marks the degree of coherence or conflictivity
presented by its elements.
The conflict
The irreconcilable conflict appears when we try to in-
terpret the elements of a PW with the negation of the
logic which rules another, so that if in one possible
state of things PW1 is real, then the non-PWl is false.
If we look again at Penrose's impossible figure (fig.
3), to which Eco also refers to illustrate «impossible
possible worlds», and divide it into two units, PW(a)
and PW(b), we get two perfectly comprehensible fig-
ures. In figure 2, PW(a) is graphically and spatially co-
herent: three parallel cylinders. PW(b) is also coherent,
made up of a prismatic U-shapéd angle.
PW(a) PW(b)
Fig. 2
The conflict arises when we try to intersect these
two worlds on the logical basis of one of them. In spite
of the coherence of the six parallel lines of the intersec-
tion (fig. 3), the assumed perception of three cylinders
makes it impossible to accept the U-shaped angle. And
vice-versa. Placed within the logic of this latter figure,
we cannot accept the three cylinders as coherent.
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Fig. 1
Conflict PW1 -> PW2
PW2 -> PW1
Fig. 3
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Thus, when there are two correct and simultaneous
versions in conflict with no possibility of reconcile-
ment, we can only admit some enunciates as true, and
we must consider those which conflict as false.
We must ask ourselves, however, how we can con-
ciliate different, or even contradictory, PWs in the
same person. How can I come to reconcile, for exam-
ple, my present world with other, co-present, worlds,
when the values, rules, and dictates of one are incom-
patible with the requirements and servitudes obligato-
ry in others? How can we know which of all PWs we
must recognise as real?
These and other questions show to what extent si-
multaneous coexistence of different PWs is complex
and conflicting. Cohabitation of individuals and be-
haviour corresponding to different or even contradic-
tory logic allow readings which are hardly reconcilable
and which often lead to incomprehension. This was the
reason that, in Wonderland, the poor, delicious oysters
at table to eat were finally eaten by their own hosts.
Within the same discourse, antagonism between
true enunciates is not acceptable. To admit them, we
would have to admit that all enunciates are true within
one same world, and this world would, in itself, be
impossible. However, conflict, insofar as it can be as-
similated, is inherent to the PW. The existence of a PW
as an active structure depends on conflict, to the point
that if we abstracted all the traits responsible for disa-
greement and incoherence, as Goodman says, we
would only have versions without things, or facts, or
even PWs.
In our everyday life, the interpretation of PWs is
rarely presented as completely irreconcilable. The de-
gree of tolerance and assimilation when faced with si-
multaneous versions in conflict depends on the greater
or lesser degree of effort carried out by the elements in
conflict within a different PW where this conflict is not
possible. Thus, the enunciates in disagreement can
cease to be conflicting if we are capable of considering
them separately, where each case is true within the cor-
responding sub-PW or different PWs.
The PW we live as a real present is built on values,
beliefs, and truths which, although rigid, allow free-
dom when explaining them to specific individuals who
do not necessarily belong to the same PW or, at least to
a sub-PW of the former. Thus, even though we consid-
er an individual's behaviour as perverse or incoherent,
we can assimilate it and even consider it coherent if we
make the effort of contextualising it within another
PW in which the behaviour attributed to this individu-
al responds to the logic ruling there. Thus, behaviour
and truths in conflict, if they are not unequal or re-
spond to opposite principles, can be judged coherent if
they are placed in another PW or sub-world which in-
cludes them.
We can also find cases in which truths which are in
open conflict can be reconciled by the simple elimina-
tion of a specific ambiguity. Thus, phrases considered
incompatible only because they are eliptic can become
something altogether different when certain peculiari-
ties are developed and made explicit.
When the elements are unequal and contradict the
present/real PW we refer to, or when its difference is
deemed excessive, that is, when we are incapable of
making the effort of contextualising within the world
that does not belong to it, or when we simply do not
believe it is convenient to contextualise, the elements
alien to our PW show themselves to be inappropriate,
false, or absurd, or are simply set aside and ignored.
Thus, Alice deems the Rabbit, the Cheshire Cat,
Tweedledum and Tweedledee, the Hatter, and the
March Hare risible and grotesque; «They're all so ri-
diculous!», exclaims Alice, shut into her own PW. The
Queen of Hearts also recognises, although belatedly,
the impossibility of assimilating different worlds, such
as Alice's and her own: «You're not to be trusted», she
exclaims, «you're not diamonds, spades, or clubs. You
don't belong to this kingdom!»
The visit to different PWs, either by lineal transit
or cohabitation, is always full of conflict, although the
transcendence of this conflict is different in one case or
the other. In the lineal transit of the Little Prince, the
effort of adapting to the principles of logic which rule
in each of the PWs, though they may produce strange-
ness and indignation, the communication links be-
tween interpreter and the several worlds are never bro-
ken altogether. The distance produced between the
only real PW and the fictional ones of the past or fu-
ture provokes the need to interpret the present coher-
ently, and, thus, to adapt its logic to acquired experi-
ence. It is not the same in the structure of co-present
worlds for Alice. In the simultaneous cohabitation of
different PWs, the interpreter remains within the
framework of one of the PWs, and lives the other
world from this perspective. In this case, conflictive sit-
uations can become incomprehensible and be deemed
absurd or irreconcileable, to the point that they impose
rejection and anull any possibility of communication.
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We are destined to transit through different PWs
which, as active structures, continually force us to
search for possible behaviour and contextualise ele-
ments in conflict within worlds where these elements
become coherent. Only thus, and insofar as they adapt
to our purpose and needs, will we mark the limits of
our environment and turn it into a structure useful to
our continuity.
Eco calls text a lazy instrument in the sense that it
demands that the reader do part of its work. In the
same way, living a PW as a social construction of real-
ity requires the effort of the addressee to accept the
world presented and infer coherent individuals and
behaviour to complete it. We cannot forget that the
addressee's committment of acceptance and adhesion,
insofar as it depends on values, also becomes an ideo-
logical fact and, from this point of view, the version of
a PW will be considered coherent and acceptable by
the receiver if it does not contradict solid beliefs or any
of the concepts which inform them.
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